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1. Methodological introduction to Courts’ use of the
Nice Charter.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
proclaimed in Nice in December 2000, re-proclaimed and signed by the
presidents of Parliament, of the Council and of the Commission in
Strasbourg on the 12th of December 2007, was closely followed by the
signing of the Treaty that modified the institutive Treaties in Lisbon, 13
th
of December 2007.
The history of the Charter is well-known and therefore here will be
dealt with only in brief. Originally destined to be incorporated into the
European Constitution, the Charter of Nice came to the same end.
Following the failure of the legislative adoption process, the same term
“constitution” was eliminated from successive attempts at reform with
obvious disappointment on the part of those who had hoped for the
constitutional consecration of fundamental rights, and in particular of
social rights
1.
With the Treaty that modified the institutive Treaties, hope was
rekindled; art. 6 of the EU Treaty, reformed to 1 co., was, in fact
provided that “The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which
shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”
2.
(
1) A. SOMMA is very pessimistic about the possibility that EU fundamental rights codified in
the Charter of Nice could create a framework of hard regulations to avoid a reduction in the
levels of protection assured by the national legal systems, in Soft law sed law. Diritto
morbido e neocorporativismo nella costruzione dell’Europa dei mercati e nella distruzione
dell’Europa dei diritti, RCDP, 2008, 437 ss.
2 During the European Council of Brussels held on the 20
th June 2008 it was stressed that
«The European Council recalls that the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon requires
ratification by each of the 27 Member States in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements. It reaffirms its wish to see the Treaty enter into force by the
end of 2009 ». With specific regard to the particular position of Ireland, the Council
established that «Having carefully noted the concerns of the Irish people as set out by the
Taoiseach, the European Council, at its meeting of 11-12 December 2008, agreed that,
provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a decision would be taken, in accordance
with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to
include one national of each Member State. 3. The European Council also agreed that other
concerns of the Irish people, as presented by the Taoiseach, relating to taxation policy, the
right to life, education and the family, and Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality,
would be addressed to the mutual satisfaction of Ireland and the other Member States, by
way of the necessary legal guarantees. It was also agreed that the high importance
attached to a number of social issues, including workers' rights, would be confirmed».
Furthermore, with reference to the Charter of Nice, The Council concluded that «Nothing in
the Treaty of Lisbon attributing legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, or in the provisions of that Treaty in the area of Freedom, Security and4 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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Against this backdrop of tormented normative procedure which
reflects the general political difficulties regarding the process of
integration, the first signs of law in action began to emerge, created by
the judiciary of the Court of Justice, and even earlier by the Advocates
General.
Following its solemn proclamation, the importance of the Charter
of Nice became immediately apparent, not only due to its political
significance, but also due to its juridical implications, both real and
potential
3, as the first catalogue of rights specific to the EU
4. In the
process of forming constitutional orders, legal scholars tend to recognise
an increasingly important role to the founding norms, a/o recognising
fundamental rights, compared to the rules of organisation and
implementation of the system itself and to the question itself of
sovereignty
5.
It is precisely for this reason that we considered it useful to
conduct research on a Courts’ decisions which would indicate above all
the effects of the Charter of Nice on supranational and national legal
systems, but also reciprocal relationships between systems. In brief, in
the light of careful analysis of the judgments of the Court of Luxembourg,
of the General Advocate’s Conclusions and of national judges’ rulings, we
have the first real acid test of the juridical power of the Charter
6.
Justice affects in any way the scope and applicability of the protection of the right to life in
Article 40.3.1, 40.3.2 and 40.3.3, the protection of the family in Article 41 and the
protection of the rights in respect of education in Articles 42 and 44.2.4 and 44.2.5 provided
by the Constitution of Ireland».
3 S. GIUBBONI, Solidarietà e sicurezza sociale nella Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione
Europea, DLRI, 2001, 617 ss.
4 M. CARTABIA, Una Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, Quad. cost., 2000,
459 ss.
5 See for all, A SPADARO, Verso la Costituzione europea: il problema delle garanzie
giurisdizionali dei diritti, DPCE, 2003, 314 ss. and ibid. further references to the debate of
constitutional doctrine. In particular on the various constitutional structures and on the
collocation of rights above all in the “long” constitutions, see R. GUASTINI, Teoria e ideologia
dell’interpretazione costituzionale, GCost., 2006, 1, 751 ss.
6 From another point of view, the majority of legislative documents published after the
declaration with which the EU institutions formally bound themselves to the dispositions of
the Charter, refer in a different way to the Charter or its individual dispositions. Cf. for
example, the directive regarding services of the internal market 2006/123/CE of the 12
th
December 2006, the directive proposal of the Council xxx applications of the principle of
equal treatment of persons regardless of their religion, beliefs, disability, age or sexual
orientation [COM (2008) 426 def., 2
nd July 2008]. And again the Conclusions of the Council
of 22
nd May 2008 on multilingualism (in G.U.U.E 6
th June 2008, n.C140, p. 10) in which
there is reference to art.22 on cultural, religious and linguistic diversity; consideration no.
30 of the Directive 2008/50/CE of the 21
st May 2008, relative to the quality of the
environmental air and for a cleaner air in Europe (in G.U.U.E. 11
th June 2008, n. L 152,p 1
which makes reference to art.37 on the protection of the environment as considerationTHE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
STATEMENT OF REASONS (2000-2008)
5
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 74/2009
To this end our intention was to start from an analysis of juridical
law in action, in the light of the lessons of a great legal expert, according
to whom “The figure of law in action must be introduced into the debate
regarding sources of law” therefore “juridically law in action is the same
law in force as it is interpreted and applied by the judiciary”
7.
On the basis of this theoretical premise our aim was to verify to
what extent and in which way The Charter of Nice and the single articles
contained within it have been used by EU and domestic judges, until now.
The various Courts, at various levels of jurisdiction, are faced with the
non-binding nature of a document whose constitutional importance and
value, however, are ever increasing in the sphere of fundamental rights
on a supranational level.
The reference to law in action appears to be particularly useful in
this approach for a series of reasons: a) it seems beyond doubt, as
indicated by several parties, the preeminent importance of the European
Courts’ rulings in the construction of the constitutional basis of the new
order; b) the dynamics of the order in progress, with the increasing
convergence of the juridical systems determined by the process of
European integration, render the differences between systems of
common law and civil law less clear-cut, by considering law in action as a
source of law
8; c) In the European order the preceding rulings does not
no.45 of the Directive 2008/56/CE of the 17
th June 2008 which institutes a framework for
Community action in the field of policies for marine environments (Directive framework on
the strategy for marine environments) (in G.U.U.E 25
th June 2008, n.L164, p.19). See also
the reference to various rights (no discrimination, of property, protection of professional and
family life, consumer protection (in G.U.U.E. 22 May 2008, L 133, p.66).
7 On the concept of law in action, see the masterly elaboration of L. MENGONI, Diritto
vivente, Jus, 1988, 15 ss. 19 in which he writes: “Law in action can express an authoritative
restriction of application to future cases only on condition that it is transformable into a
dogmatic rule on the basis of which an intersubjective agreement which guarentees
coherence with rationality of the positive system” ibid. p. 21. In general, also P. GROSSI,
Mitologie giuridiche della modernità, Giuffrè, 2005. See also M. CALVINO, La dottrina del
diritto vivente come teoria del precedente giudiziario, Diritto e formazione, 2005, 1, 159; .
ID., Il precedente tra certezza del diritto e libertà del giudice: la sintesi del diritto vivente,
Dir. Soc. 2001, 1, 159. With less dogmatic precision, the labour law doctrine tends to refer
to the concept of law in action to generically extra legislative rights, even including
contractual sources and of doctrinal creation; in the first sense, see S: NADELET,
Eguaglianza e nuove differenze nel diritto del lavoro. Una riflessione sui lavori flessibili.
(parte seconda). Insegnamenti e incognite di un’indagine su un diritto vivente del lavoro,
LD, 2005, 1, 3 ss. In the second, A VALLEBONA, L’autonomia privata collettiva nel diritto
vivente, MGL, 2008, 8/9, 622 ss.
8 The comparative doctrine has for some time debate on the radical differences between
systems of civil law and common law. See G. SACCO, Il giurista in Europa: problematiche e
prospettive, Contr. Impr. Eur. 2002, 789 ss.; G. ALPA, Il diritto giurisprudenziale e il diritto
«vivente». Convergenza o affinità dei sistemi giuridici?, Rass. Forense, 2007, 2, 493. See6 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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function according to the technique of stare decisis, in which the value of
the previous rulings is considered a priori as a useful element to providing
criteria of judgement and to establishing precise limits to the discretion of
the judge. Instead it takes on an importance a posteriori, constituting an
element aimed at evaluating results rather than limiting the interpretive
discretion of the judge
9. Due to this there is a greater heuristic
consonance of the “continental approach” to the law in action and to
dialogue between the Courts of the European legal system.
The first part of this work is dedicated to European Courts
decisions and to the Advocate General’s Conclusions; the second part is
dedicated to domestic judges’ decisions.
The abovementioned division of the work aims to highlight if and
to what extent the attitude demonstrated in comparisons of the same
“phenomenon” by supranational judiciary and national judiciary – who are
considered EU judges of the first level – is different, and to identify the
various consequences that it determines.
2. 1
st Part. EU Courts’ rulings. The salient data.
a) The selection of documents
The first phase of the research concentrated on the selection of
available data
10. We chose to use a wide-based set of criteria, on the
basis of which Judgments (of the Court of Justice, but also the Court of
the First Instance) and the Conclusions were selected where the terms
“Charter of Nice” and “Fundamental rights” appeared together or
alternatively. This was done in order to guarantee that a reasoned and
also M. R. FERRARESE, Diritto sconfinato, Laterza, 45 ss. and ibid. further references in
notes 21-23.
9 M. CALVINO, La dottrina del diritto vivente, op. cit. p. 1005: “Value is not attributed to the
preceding decision before the judge pronounces his decision. It will be given value only if
confirmed ex post by other decisions of the same type: once many judges have pronounced
the same decision, and only then, on the basis of a judgement a posteriori on their actions,
will it be possible to affirm the existence of law in action”. On law in action as a
“macroscopic” example of the rhetorical circular relationship on the basis of which it
constitutes “a series of meanings which the community of interpreters have chosen as the
most “credible” interpretation of the dispositions which the community itself retains in force,
(constituting) the set of conventions stipulated by components of the community” cf. R.
BIN, La Corte costituzionale tra potere e retorica: spunti per la costruzione di un modello
ermeneutica nei rapporti tra Corte e giudici di merito, in A. ANZON, B. CARAVITA, M. LUCIANI,
M. VOLPI (edited by), La Corte costituzionale e gli altri poteri dello Stato, Giappichelli, 1993,
8 ss.
10 The database used is the official one of the Commission, Eur-lex, consultable at the
website http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm. Also fundamental was the invaluable
collaboration of CDE – centre of European Documentation of the University of Catania – and
in particular Chiara Cantarella.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
STATEMENT OF REASONS (2000-2008)
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correlated interpretation of the documents provided the most detailed
picture possible of the legal institutions’ attitude towards the Charter
considered as a whole, and of its single articles.
In this first part of the research, we were able to ascertain that
the number of judgments in which the Charter and its articles are cited
varies according to the year in which the sentence was given: that it
increases with time (in total 72)
11. This confirms the intrinsic authority of
the Charter (growing) and of the relative independence of this authority
from its formal juridical status (contrarily, subject to wavering fortune).
On the other hand, from the documentation of the Advocates
General’s Conclusions, partially different data emerged: the number of
Conclusions in which the Charter was cited remained more or less
constant over the years (in total 139)
12 and furthermore, to the objective
variable time, the subjective variable, the juridical sensibility of the single
Advocate General, is added.
b) The subdivision of the documents by articles
In the second phase the cataloguing of EU documents was further
refined using reference to the articles cited. It was then possible to
identify a rather uniform trend in both the judgments and the
conclusions, on the basis of which it was revealed that the provisions of
the Charter which are most cited are those generally contained in
paragraph VI-Justice and one in particular, contained instead in
paragraph V-Citizenship (Right to good administration, art. 41)
13.
c) Modality and techniques of referencing the articles
Lastly, the third phase regards the analysis of the merit of the EU
rulings and Conclusions, guided by criteria identified previously and
aimed at the comprehension – via the application of precise canons of
interpretation (generic reference – indirect application – direct
application) of the ways of referencing used by the judges and Advocates
11 Data on the increase of the number of judgments for each year are the following: 2001-
1; 2002-4; 2003-7; 2004-9; 2005-10; 2006-12; 2007-15; 2008-14.
12 The data on the growth of the number of Conclusions for each year are the following:
2001-16; 2002-11; 2003-17; 2004-20; 2005-18; 2006-16; 2007-17; 2008-24.
13 As regards the Judgments, the data on the most cited article is as follows: Preamble-1;
General reference-9; art.7-4; art. 8-4; art. 11-1; art. 12-1; art. 17-5; art. 20-1; art 21-2;
art. 24-3; art. 28-2; art. 39-1; art 41-16; art. 42-4; art. 46-1; art 47-22; art. 48-8; art.
49-7; art. 50-3; art. 51-1; art. 52-2; art. 53-2.
As regards the Conclusions, the data on the most cited articles is as follows: Preamble-1,
General reference:- 8; art. 1-2; art. 3-1; art. 7-13; art. 8-6; art. 9-1; art. 11-3; art. 12-4;
art. 14-1; art. 15-1; art. 16-3; art. 17-9; art. 18-1; art. 20-4; art. 21-11; art. 22-1; art.
23-3; art. 24-4; art. 26-1; art. 27-3; art. 28-3; art. 30-1; art. 31-6; art. 34-1; art. 35-1;
art. 36-5; art. 37-3; art. 41- 25; art. 42-5; art. 45-7; art. 47- 38; art. 48- 11; art. 49-11;
art. 50- 7; art. 51-5; art. 52- 9.8 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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General. In this way it was possible to obtain a first evaluation not of the
general influence, but rather on the specific significance which the
Charter has gradually obtained, eight years on from its first proclamation
and in spite of its continuing lack of legal bindingness (rectius, a
promised legal bindingness).
Subsequently it was decided to subdivide Judgments and
Conclusions based on the modality of citation of the Charter so as to
qualify and identify the hypotheses whereby it is used merely as an
interpretative support, or on the other hand, as if it were already legally
binding. In the first case, when only an occasional reference is made to
the Charter, that which is highlighted is exclusively its political
significance, placed, however, in the context of juridical argumentation
and decisions through the generic reference to its authority, which
remains, in any case, only political. On the other hand, in the second
case the juridical significance is sublimated through either direct
application, or, as in the majority of cases, indirect. Direct application
means the decision is based precisely on the article referred to, while
indirect application means that the Charter is quoted in the judge’s
statement of reasons, thereby conditioning it, but which technically does
not provide the basis for the decision
14.
3. EU judges and Advocates General
Quantitative data relative to references to the Charter is indicative
of the different approaches adopted by EU judges and the Advocates
General to this document.
Among Judgments and Conclusions, in fact, there appears to be a
difference in references not only due to the time factor, that is, of the
chronological vicinity to the adoption of the Charter.
The trend shows that the number of judgments in which the EU
judges, those of the Court of Justice in particular, make reference to the
Charter of Nice and/or to its articles, increases over the years. Until
2006, the Court had kept an “impassable” silence, “bordering on
provocation”
15. To explicit references in the same cases, on the part of
the Advocates General, the Court responded with a deafening silence,
causing an evident fin de non-recevoir. This phase in relations between
Advocates General and judges of the Court of Justice, concerning the
14 Cf. for the modality of citation used in the text, B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali fondamentali
nell’ordinamento costituzionale europeo, in Il lavoro subordinato, vol. VI of the Trattato di
diritto privato dell’Unione Europea directed by G. Ajani and G. A. Benacchio, Giappichelli,
2009.
15 J. WEILER, Diritti umani, costituzionalismo ed integrazione: iconografie e feticismo,
QCost., 2002, 521 ss.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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references to the Charter of Nice, could be defined as asymmetric
parallelism. To the Advocates General’s suggestions to optimize the
Charter, the Court, on the same cases, demonstrated a rather different
attitude. The most convincing explanation of this initial prudence on
behalf of the Court in terms of juridical politics and constitutional
equilibrium was given by Poiares Maduro
16. It was not simply a question
of the Court’s understandable prudence when called to rule – contrary to
the Advocates General who are less bound by responsibility – on issues
regarding relations between States and between States and the Union.
Rather, there appeared to be an evident crisis of perception of its own
institutional role which was until the emanation of the Charter “relatively
free” to found a new supranational constitutional system, based also on
the rights declared by the Court itself. And this, considering the political
choice made by other EU institutions to formally “claim rights”, which
risked curbing both their judicial creativity and role of the ECJ as political
barycentre in the EU’s institutional order.
This asymmetry in the approaches of the Court and the Advocates
General is highlighted by the datas.
The number of Conclusions in which the Charter is mentioned in
some way, unlike the Judgments, is constant over a period of time. The
Advocates General, since the very first proclamation, showed their
sensitivity towards a document which for the first time lists a catalogue of
EU fundamental rights. This is also due to the relatively informal “style”,
of the conclusions, which allows for a more relaxed, discursive use of the
charter, compared to the more traditional, legalistic and deductive
approach of the Court
17.
A variation in the number of Conclusions which cite the Charter
can be verified when the specific Advocate General who dealt with the
question in point is considered. This would most probably depend on the
16 M. POIARES MADURO, The double Constitutional life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, in T.K. HERVEY AND J. KENNER (edited by) Economic and Social
Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Legal Perspective, Hart Publishing,
2003.
17 On the style of the Court of Justice, see S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, A Tale of Two Courts:
Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European Human Rights Acquis, Com. Mark, Law
Review 2006, 43, 629-665. See also M. ROSENFELD, Comparing constitutional review by
the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, Int. Journ. Const. Law, 2006, 1
ss. E M.LASSER ,Anticipating Three Models of Judicial Control, Debate and Legitimacy: The
European Court of Justice, the Cour de cassation and the United States Supreme Court,
Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/03.10 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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juridical, political and cultural background of the individual Advocate
General
18.
It can certainly be affirmed that almost immediately after the
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights the Advocates General –
and some more than others – began to cite the document directly as a
whole, and also to particular articles contained within it, as an element of
reconstruction of EU legislation, considered useful in the solution of
concrete cases in point or as a juridical instrument to define the question.
However, in only 7 cases
19 was the stance taken by the Advocate General
in accordance with that of the judges of the Court of Luxembourg, and if
they referred to specific fundamental rights contained in the Charter as
will be seen, they did so parsimoniously and cautiously.
4. How the Charter has been used in EU Court
decisions
As already stated, the way the Charter of Nice and its articles are
cited makes it possible to subdivide Judgments and Conclusions,
depending on if it is used occasionally, with a merely rhetorical reference,
or inserted in a more structural way in the process of juridical
argumentation.
Among those described, the most common modality of reference
is without a doubt the indirect application of the Charter, which rises in
rank to that which has been defined soft law or semi hard law
20. As it
would be impossible to attribute apertis verbis to a juridical restriction
which has not yet been consecrated in the Treaty, the Charter, and the
fundamental rights recognised within it, are implicated in a circular
decision-making process. In this way they enter the decisions of the
judges or the opinions of the Advocates General indirectly frequently via
18 The data on the single Advocates General and the number of times in which each of them
used the Charter in their Conclusions are the following: Alber-2; Bot-3; Geelhoed-15;
Jacobs-6; Kokott-24; Leger-9; Mazàk-1; Mengozzi-4; Mischo-2; Poiares Maduro-15; Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer-31; Sharpston-7; Stix-Hackl-11; Tizzano-3; Trstenjak-6.
19 These are the cases, C-450/06, Varec SA c. Stato belga; -303/05,Advocaten voor de
Wereld VZW c. Leden van de Ministerraad; C-402/05 P.Yassin Abdullah Kadi e Barakaat
International Foundation c. Council of EU and Commission of European Community; C-
341/05, Lavel un Partneri Ltd c. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareforbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan e Svenska Elektriker forbundet; C-
275/06, Productores de Mùsica de Espana (promusicae) c. Telefònica de Espana SAY e C-
540/03 Parlamento europeo c. Consiglio dell’Unione europea.
20 Cf. B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali fondamentali, op. cit.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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reference to common constitutional traditions consecrated in the
European document
21.
Less frequent – but in some ways more courageous and without a
doubt more significant – is the use that some judges, but above all some
Advocates General, have made of the Charter as if it were already a
legally binding force. The judgments in which the Court took a radical
decision, attributing “European” dignity to some fundamental rights
sanctioned in the Charter, are already well-known but this stance did not
lead to logical consequences
22. However, we are dealing here with cases
whose peculiarity call for serious reflection
23. These examples, surely
more salient, do not however exhaust the number of documents which
fall into the category of “direct application”. There are, in fact other
examples – mainly the Conclusions of the Advocates General – in which
the fundamental rights contained in the Charter were referred to with the
aim of resolving preliminary questions.
In opposition to direct application there is a way of referring to
the Charter which is merely evocative. This approach can be found in
those judgments and conclusions where the Charter is evoked as only
one of the elements, and one of the less important ones at that, in the
reconstruction of the general normative framework within which the
concrete case in point is considered. It is a “rhetorical” use of the
Charter of Nice which highlights, essentially, as previously mentioned, its
authority as a political document.
4.1. The Charter as an (occasional) element in the reconstruction
of the normative framework of reference. Its rhetorical use.
In a hypothetical scale of an ascending climax, which from the low
point of indifference climbs to a high point of direct application, the first
and least significant form of use of the Charter of Nice would be its
citation as a mere stylistic ornament; the reference, as a clause of style,
does not make use of the articles which could be pertinent to the
21 On the relationship between common constitutional traditions and the Charter of Nice, cf.
A. RUGGERI, Struttura e dinamica delle tradizioni costituzionali nella prospettiva
dell’integrazione europea, in Ars interpretandi, 2003, 211 ss., here p. 227ss.
22 The reference is to the sentence Laval and Viking to which we will return shortly. Among
the categories which were adopted, the above mentioned sentence technically comes under
the typology defined as “indirect application” given that the fundamental right sanctioned by
the Charter of Nice – the rights of bargaining and collective action (art.28) – even though
recognised, were not however affirmed by the Court which instead applied the technique of
balancing in favour of the specific liberty sanctioned by the Treaty with which the rights
conflicted in this specific case, respectively free supply of services and the rights of the
establishment.
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resolution of the case, but to the Charter as a whole, which is considered
one of the sources, and usually not the most important, of a more
articulated catalogue which serves as a normative context (generic) of
general reference.
This is almost an obligatory passage, above all where the citation
of the Charter is made by the plaintiff of the case in which the preliminary
question was raised and exposed to the Court. However, there are a
number of documented cases of indifference where the reference made
by the plaintiff to an article of the Charter considered relevant falls by the
wayside; no trace can be found of it in either the Conclusions of the
Advocates General let alone in the judgments of the Court of Justice.
In some aspects, the attitude of EU judges and Advocates General
is not dissimilar to that described above, when, for example, they only
make reference to the Charter of Nice in the footnotes, giving no space to
it whatsoever in the sentence or the Conclusions, let alone the provisions.
Starting from this type of reference we can note some differences
in the attitudes of the Court and of the Advocates General regarding the
use of the Charter.
In all the period under consideration (2000-2008) the cases in
which the Court cited the Charter in the notes or in the form of reference
of the claim of the plaintiff are much more numerous than those in which
the Advocates General do so. Yet the number of Conclusions in which the
Charter is cited is much higher than that of the Judgments. This means
that the Advocates General have in the vast majority of cases, preferred
to give a higher profile to the Charter, rather than relegating it to the
notes as the judges have frequently done.
The different attitudes manifested appear even clearer in those
cases where the difference between prospected solution and decision
made is registered with reference to the same preliminary question,
object of the same case. In fact, it has even happened, that in the same
case, the Court quoted the Charter of Nice among the references made
by the plaintiff, while the Advocate General had used indirect application.
As for example in the case The Queen against the Secretary of
State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (investments) Ltd
and Imperial Tobacco Ltd in which Advocate General Geelhoed in his
Conclusions of September 2002, had tried to argue the solution
suggested to the Court using reference to the effective jurisdictional
protection of which to art. 47 and to the rights of property of which to
art. 17 of the Charter
24 , conflicting with the indifference of the Court
24 Conclusions of Geelhoed, 10th September 2002, C-491/01, The Queen v. Secretary for
Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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which restricted itself to quoting only the reference to art. 17 as made
by the plaintiff
25.
The same dyscrasia can be recorded with reference to the case
Aalborg Portland A7S and a. c. Commission of the European Community.
Also in this case, the Advocate General tried to make a decisive reference
to the Charter
26, while the Court considered only in passing the reference
made by the plaintiff
27.
4.2 Use of the Charter as interpretive support: its use as soft or
semi hard law. The case of indirect application: the European
Court
“The right to property is not a right recognised as such by the EC or EU Treaties. Article 17
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does, it is true, recognise the right to property (and
the protection of intellectual property). With regard to the present legal position, however, I
attach more importance to Article 6 EU. That article requires the European Union to respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by, inter alia, the ECHR, as general principles of
Community law. One of those fundamental rights is the right to property, as referred to in
Article 1, First Protocol, of the ECHR." (point 259).
25 Court of Justice, 10th December 2002, - C-491/01,The Queen c. Secretary of State for
Health, ex parte British American Tobacco Investments Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.
“According to Japan Tobacco, Article 7 of the Directive prohibits it from exercising its
intellectual property rights by preventing it from using its trade mark Mild Seven in the
Community and by depriving it of the economic benefit of its exclusive licences for that
trade mark. Such a result entails infringement of the right to property, which is recognised
to be a fundamental human right in the Community legal order, protected by the first
subparagraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
( ECHR) and enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union” (point 144).
26 Conclusions of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 11th February 2003, Cases reunited C-204/00 P, C-
205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland A/S (C-
204/00 P), IrishCembent Ltd (C-205/00 P), Ciments français SA (C-211/00 P), Italcementi –
Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA (C-213/00 P), Buzzi Unicem SpA (C-217/00 P) and
Cementir – Cementerie del Tirreno SpA (C-219/00) v. Commission of the European
Community. “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (26) takes the
matter further, since, in addition to providing that an accused is entitled to defend his legal
position in a fair and public judicial procedure, before an independent and impartial tribunal
previously established by law, it also provides that every person has the right to be heard
by the institutions of the European Union before any individual measure which could affect
him or her adversely is taken and the right to have access to his or her file” (point 27).
27 Court of Justice, 7th January 2004, cases reunited C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P,
C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalbourg Portland A/S (Portland A/S (C-204/00
P), IrishCembent Ltd (C-205/00 P), Ciments français SA (C-211/00 P), Italcementi –
Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA (C-213/00 P), Buzzi Unicem SpA (C-217/00 P) and
Cementir – Cementerie del Tirreno SpA (C-219/00) v. Commission of the European
Community. “[…] The right of access to those documents should be regarded as a
fundamental right for the purposes of Article F of the Treaty on European Union (now, after
amendment, Article 6 EU) and also under Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 42 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 (OJ
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We have already highlighted the ambivalent nature of this
document that lacks a legal binding force, but which contains a list of
fundamental rights, acting as surrogate to a formal supranational
Constitution .
In spite of the obstacles and the numerous hindrances
encountered along the way to acquiring binding juridical efficacy, The
Charter of Nice, in fact, even before its inception, absolved the role of
founding element and indispensible presupposition to the full
legitimisation of the European Union by those who had supported its
approbation; the Charter of Nice, furthermore, had sanctioned «visibly
the crucial importance of fundamental rights and the significance that
they have for European citizens»
28.
Following its approbation, for the undoubted importance which it
represents, the Charter in applicative phase then clearly superseded the
simple declaration of principle collocating it on the crest – sometimes
superseded – which separates it from full constitutional consecration.
29
And it is exactly to this position, half-way between political
reference and juridical use, that the EU Courts and the Advocates General
have attested. They have demonstrated, albeit in different ways and
intensities, a preference for indirect application of the Fundamental
rights proclaimed at Nice.
The reference to the Charter – considered as a whole or with
reference to specific articles – operates in the majority of cases as a
merely interpretative support to a decision which has its basis elsewhere,
or to an argumentation founded on other grounds, rarely constituting,
therefore, the juridical basis of the solution chosen by the Court or
suggested by the Advocate General.
Nevertheless, the use of the Charter of Nice as an argumentative
support which is inserted in the final decision-making, justifies the
observation that it now carries also juridical importance, no longer only
political, which can be perceived, for example, when the reference
appears just in the notes or the citation is made only in passing. In fact,
28 R. ADAM, Da Colonia a Nizza: la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, Il diritto
dell’Unione Europea, 2000, 4, 881
29 The use of this term is consented in the awareness that it has been removed from
documents and EU projects. In the Conclusions of the German Presidency of the European
Council of 26th June 2007, in which it was conferred a mandate to the CIG for the
elaboration of a “treaty of reform” of the existing treaties, one can read in fact that «The
constitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them
by a single text called "Constitution", is abandoned» (p. 2); that «The TEU and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character» and, finally, that
«The terminology used throughout the Treaties will reflect this change: the term
"Constitution" will not be used».THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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in these cases, even if it is not the basis for the decisions –
understandably considering its “soft” nature – the Charter occupies a
prominent position in the statement of reasons of the Court and of the
Advocates General, producing “soft” effects, in accordance with its
nature.
Examples of this approach can be found in the judgments of both
The Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the First Instance, and more
numerously in the Conclusions of the Advocates General.
The most illustrious cases are represented by the judgments Laval
and Viking
30 significant for more than one reason. In fact, not only do
they constitute a sort of paradigm of use of the Charter as an instrument
of semi hard law, but they also highlight the intrinsic limits in the lack of
legal bindingness of the same. With the current situation of weak
juridification of the Charter (proclaimed but not ratified) in order to
resolve the case in point the Court had to conduct an operation of “free
balancing”
31 – in which the results could have been different if the
fundamental social rights to strike and of collective action, here
implicated, had drawn their origins from a primary source legislative
source.
32
In the judgments Laval and Viking, the Court cites expressly the
right to collective action contained in the Charter of Nice, recognising its
full functionality within the supranational juridical order.
“In that regard, it must be recalled that the right to take collective
action is recognised both by various international instruments which the
Member States have signed or cooperated in, such as the European
Social Charter, signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 – to which, moreover,
express reference is made in Article 136 EC – and Convention No 87 of
30 Court of Justice, 18th December 2007, C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd c. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Svenska Byggnadarbetareforbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan e
Svenska Elektrikerforbundet and Court of Justice, 11
th December 2007, C-438/05,
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seaman’s Union c. Viking Line ABP
and OU Viking Line Eesti.
31 Cf. B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali, op. cit. 736 e, and for analogous considerations P.
CARETTI, I diritti fondamentali nell’ordinamento nazionale e nell’ordinamento comunitario,
Dir. pubbl., 2001, 946.
32 It is worth mentioning that recently the Court of Strasbourg included the Charter of Nice
among the European Instruments with reference to art. 28 of the Charter of Nice, aligning
European Social Charter and the Charter of Nice in the sentence of 12
th November 2008,
Demir and Baykara c. Turkey. On the theme of dialogue, for a reconstruction of the
relationship between national judges and the Court of Strasbourg, from the judgments of
the Italian Constitutional Court no. 348 and 349 of 2007 regarding the relationship between
Italian legal order and the ECHR, cf. L. MONTANARI, Giudici nazionali e Corte di Strasburgo:
alcune riflessioni tra interpretazione conforme e margine di apprezzamento, Dir. pubbl.
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the International Labour Organisation concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise of 9 July 1948 – and by
instruments developed by those Member States at Community level or in
the context of the European Union, such as the Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers adopted at the meeting of the
European Council held in Strasbourg on 9 December 1989, which is also
referred to in Article 136 EC, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000” (point 90).
In the next passage, however, the same right, which has just
been recognised, is circumscribed and limited by specific restrictions
deriving from EU law and from national legislation and praxis.
In this way the Court affirms
“Although the right to take collective action must therefore be
recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the
general principles of Community law the observance of which the Court
ensures, the exercise of that right may none the less be subject to certain
restrictions. As is reaffirmed by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, it is to be protected in accordance with
Community law and national law and practices” (point 91)
33.
Apart from these examples of indirect application of social
fundamental rights – as manifest and debated as they are rare in
number – it has been possible to establish, as previously indicated, that
the most used articles of the Charter by judges – from the Court and the
Court of First instance are those contained in paragraphs II –Freedom
and VI – Justice.
Article 24, for example, concerning protection of children, was
invoked by the EU Court of Justice in the case Dynamic Medien Vertriebs
GmBH c. Avides Media AG of the 14
th February 2008
34 in order to perform
an operation of balancing. The aim was to stem the free circulation of
goods of which to art. 28 Treaty of Rome, via the identification of a
legitimate restriction of sales and an end to video supports via
33 The Court held exactly the same position in the Viking sentence: “Although the right to
take collective action, including the right to strike, must therefore be recognised as a
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law
the observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right may none the less be
subject to certain restrictions. As is reaffirmed by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, those rights are to be protected in accordance with
Community law and national law and practices. In addition, as is apparent from paragraph 5
of this judgment, under Finnish law the right to strike may not be relied on, in particular,
where the strike is contra bonos mores or is prohibited under national law or Community
law” (point 44).
34 Court of Justice, 14th February 2008, C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH c.
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correspondence which have not undergone checks and classification in
order to protect children
35.
In all three cases reported in the notes, the fundamental rights
evoked were considered as additions to the catalogue of fundamental
rights which the EU respects, with reference to which the institutions are
obliged to measure the legitimacy of their actions in the same way as the
States must do when implementing EU regulations.
It is affirmed in the sentence Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW: “It
is common ground that those principles include the principle of the
legality of criminal offences and penalties and the principle of equality
and non-discrimination, which are also reaffirmed respectively in Articles
49, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1)”
(point 46).
The same approach is replicated in the sentence Unibet in which
the Court recalls point 37, reconstructing, furthermore, its own constant
law in action “the principle of effective judicial protection is a general
principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, […] which has also been reaffirmed by
Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union,
proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1)”.
Similarly, the reference to art. 7 made on the occasion of the
sentence Varec SA c. State of Belgium of the 14
th February 2008
36 in
which the right of respect for private life “[…] enshrined in Article 8 of
the ECHR, which flows from the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States and which is restated in Article 7 of the Charter of
fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on 7
December 2000” (point 48) was numbered as one of the fundamental
rights which deserved protection.
To summarise, in the cases described, the reference to the
Charter and the articles contained within it, which could appear rhetorical
in that it is not fundamental to the decisions made, serves, however, to
reinforce the importance of general principles of EU law derived from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, reasserted (as
35 “The protection of the child is also enshrined in instruments drawn up within the
framework of the European Union, such as the Charter of fundamental rights of the
European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1), Article 24
of which provides that children have the right to such protection and care as is necessary
for their well-being (see, to that effect, Parliament v Council, paragraph 58). Furthermore,
the Member States’ right to take the measures necessary for reasons relating to the
protection of young persons is recognised by a number of Community-law instruments, such
as Directive 2000/31” (point 41).
36 Court of Justice 14th February 2008, C-450/06, Varec SA c. State of Belgium.18 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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the Court frequently says) in Niece. Furthermore, the Charter has the
function of reinforcing, but also reflecting the rights and principles which
are fundamental to the Union, in the formal circuit of statements of
reasons and decisions of the judges of the Court.
4.2.1.… the Court of First Instance.
If the Court of Justice has maintained a certain self restraint, the
attitude of the Court of the First Instance, and above all the Advocates
General, would appear to demonstrate a greater propensity to using the
Charter. The former has used the Charter on numerous occasions since
its proclamation. In the sentence max.mobil Telekommunikation Service
GmbH c. Commission of the European Community of the 30
th January
2002
37, for example, the Tribunal, called on to decide on the subjection of
the Commission to the obligation to proceed with the examination of a
statement, had clarified previously that “[…] the diligent and impartial
treatment of a complaint is associated with the right to sound
administration which is one of the general principles that are observed in
a State governed by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional
traditions of the Member States. Article 41(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed at Nice on 7
December 2000 (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1, hereinafter the Charter of
Fundamental Rights) confirms that [e]very person has the right to have
his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time
by the institutions and bodies of the Union” (point 48)
38. The same
provision is recalled by the Tribunal in the sentence Jégo-Quérée&Cie SA
c. Commission of the European Community of the 3
rd May 2002
39.
Indeed, in the two judgments which we have spoken about, the
rights contained in articles 41 and 47 are invoked, but they are invoked
in order to reconstruct a general framework of legitimisation in which a
decision can be collocated using normative references in both cases
contained in the Treaty. The Charter of Nice, therefore is used as semi
hard law, obtaining in this case indirect application.
37 Court of First Instance EC, 30th January 2002, T – 54/99 max.mobil Telekommunikation
Service GmbH c. Commission of the European Community.
38 Furthermore, the Judge added that the fact that such an obligation falls on the
Commission does not exclude the right to a jurisdictional inspection; in fact if on the one
hand – sustains the Tribunal – “Such judicial review is also one of the general principles that
are observed in a State governed by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional
traditions of the Member States, as is confirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, under which any person whose rights guaranteed by the law of the Union are
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal” (Point 57).
39 Tribunal of First level EC, 3rd May 2002, T – 177/01, Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v. Commission
of the European Community; cf. point 42.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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More significant, however, is the affirmation of the Tribunal
contained in the sentence Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. And others c.
Commission of the European Community of the 29
th April 2004
40.
If on the one hand the reasoning seems contradictory, given that
the judges evoke the principle of ne bis idem but deny its application in
the case in point, on the other, the affirmation of its existence and
efficacy turns out to be much more substantial. To point 137 of the
sentence, the Tribunal, in fact, sustains that “It is true that Article 50 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that no one may be tried or
punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence of which he has
already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance
with the law. However, that charter is clearly intended to apply only
within the territory of the Union and the scope of the right laid down in
Article 50 is expressly limited to cases where the first acquittal or
conviction was handed down within the Union”.
In other words, the applicability of the Charter is excluded, and of
art. 50 in particular, outside EU territory, but on the contrary, in this way,
it affirms its full efficacy within.
Technically, it involves a hypothesis of indirect application of the
Charter given that the principle contained in art. 50 were not used as
the basis of the decision, but the statements of the Tribunal represent an
undoubted importance in terms of recognition of the specific right and of
the relative applicability and are a “prelude” to its direct application.
In the same way in the sentence Hans-Martin Tillack c.
Commission of European Community of the 4
th October 2006
41.
Also in this case, as in the previous one, the applicability of a
right, whose source was identified in the Charter of Nice, was excluded.
In other words, the article taken into consideration and the principle
contained within it are not applied not only because the Charter of Nice is
not legally binding, but also because it finds no application in the case in
point. In these cases, if one wanted to use an ulterior expression to
40 Tribunal of first level EC, 29th April 2004 T-236/01, T – 239/01, T -244/01 to T-246/01,
T -251/01 and T – 252/01, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. And others v. Commission of European
Community.
41 Court of First Instance EC 4th October 2006, T-193/04, Hans-Martin Tillack v.
Commission of European Community. In this case the Tribunal sustained that “[…] the
principle of sound administration, which is the only principle alleged to have been breached
in this context, does not, in itself, confer rights upon individuals […], except where it
constitutes the expression of specific rights such as the right to have affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right to have
access to files, or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of Article 41
of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December
2000 in Nice […], which is not the case here” (point 127).20 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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describe another use of the Charter, one could speak of its implicit
application.
Emblematic of the attitude of the Tribunal in using the Charter of
Nice in order to resolve concrete questions and then the affirmation of
the juridical nature of the Charter contained in the sentence Philip Morris
International, Inc e a. c. Commission of the European Community of the
15
th January 2003
42, which even though uses the technique of indirect
application, on the bases of which “The right to an effective remedy for
everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union
are violated has, moreover, been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter
of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December
2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1). Although this document does not
have legally binding force, it does show the importance of the rights it
sets out in the Community legal order”(point 122).
4.2.2.…and the Advocates General
Gradually more decisive in its constant use and in its juridical
evaluation of the Charter is the attitude taken by the Advocates General.
Immediately after the proclamation of the Charter they began to use it,
always referring to it to support the interpretations suggested by the
Court in the resolution of the concrete preliminary questions, sometimes
calling for the indirect application, but more rarely, the direct. The list of
references is now exhaustive, given that the Advocates General, as
mentioned above, showed no hesitation in using the Charter, on the
contrary to the judges of Luxembourg.
Already in the Conclusions of the 11
th December 2003
43, Advocate
General Colomer clearly affirms the important role of the Charter in
creating an EU citizenship.
“[…] the creation of citizenship of the Union, with the corollary of
freedom of movement for citizens throughout the territory of the Member
States, represents a considerable qualitative step forward in that it
separates that freedom from its functional or instrumental elements (the
link with an economic activity or attainment of the internal market) and
raises it to the level of a genuinely independent right inherent in the
political status of the citizens of the Union. Evidence of that qualitative
development lies in the fact that freedom of movement and of residence,
as an independent right, has been enshrined in Article 45(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (point 25).
42 Court of First Instance EC 15th January 2003, T-377/00 Philip Morris International, Inc
and others c. Commission of the European Community.
43 Conclusions of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 11th December 2003, C386/02, Josef Baldinger c.
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Furthermore, Advocate General Kokott, in his Conclusions of the
10
th of June 2004 and of the 3
rd May 2005, clarifies how important the
acknowledgment of a determined principle within the Charter of Nice is
regarding the legal orders of the Member States and in a supranational
context, highlighting on both occasions the importance of that which is
sanctioned by art. 49 of the Charter of Nice
44.
The object of reflection (the right under discussion) of the
Advocates General may change, but not their overall attitude regarding
the Charter.
Consequently, in the conclusions of Advocate General Sharpston of
the 28
th June 2007
45, this time regarding the principle of non
discrimination, the value of the principle of non-discrimination is affirmed,
not only as such, but above all as contained in the Charter of Nice.
“[…] Non-discrimination is also, of course, one of the fundamental
principles of EC law. It requires that comparable situations must not be
treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the
same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. The importance
of non-discrimination is underscored by the Charter of fundamental rights
of the European Union (Article 21) […]” (point 147)
46.
Again art. 21 of the Charter of Nice and the principle of non-
discrimination is used in the Conclusions of the Maruko case of the 6
th
September 2007
47 by Advocate General Colomer.
44 “The principle of the retroactivity of the more lenient criminal law, which is recognised in
the legal systems of most of the Member States of the Community (although not, for
example, in Ireland and the United Kingdom), also appears in the third sentence of Article
49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It also forms part of
secondary Community law relating to administrative penalties for irregularities which
prejudice the Community’s financial interests”(point 64, Conclusions 10th June 2004, C-
457/02, Penal proceedings against Antonio Niselli).
And again: “However, the principle of the retroactive application of a more lenient criminal
provision is not only established in the national legal systems of almost all 25 Member
States but is also recognised internationally. What is more, it has for some time now been a
part of secondary Community law, for example in the rules on administrative penalties for
irregularities prejudicial to the Community’s financial interests. That principle was also
incorporated into the third sentence of Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union” (point 156 Conclusions of 14
th October 2004, joint cases C-387/02, C-
391/02 and C-403/02, Penal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi (C-387/02), Sergio
Adelchi (391/02) and Marcello Dell’Utri and a. (C-403/02).
45 Sharpston’s Conclusions, 28th June 2007, C-212/06, Government of the Communauté
française and Gouvernement wallon c. Gouvernement flamand.
46 Against/in front of the Court – demonstrating an attitude contrary to that of Sharpston –
there is no reference to the principle of non-discrimination contained in the Charter.
47 Conclusions of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 6th September 2007, C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v.
Versorgungsanstalt der deutchen Bùhnen.22 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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It becomes in fact a moral support for interpretive operations of
undoubted value regarding the efficacy of secondary EU law. That is to
say, this efficacy is not legitimised through operations all within the
procedural regulations of the treaty and/or to the general principles of EU
law
48, but rather linked to a fundamental right positively sanctioned by
the Charter, in the style of grundnorm of the EU system. The
improvement is obviously not in the mere declaration of the supremacy of
EU law, but in the constitutional basis of its legitimisation.
The Advocate General considers, in fact, the reference to art. 21
as one of the most suitable arguments for justifying the applicability of
the directive 2000/78/EC to the actual case in point
49.
Also respect for the right to protection of human dignity
sanctioned by art. 1 of the Charter of Nice finds ample space in the
reflections of the Advocates General. In fact, this is perhaps the right
which holds first place in an ideal scale of values and importance.
Advocate General Stix-Hackl, in his Conclusions of the 18
th March
2004
50 makes very significant statements regarding its importance:
“Therefore, inasmuch as the Community as a unity of interests
considers itself to be a Community founded on respect for fundamental
and human rights, it cannot accept measures by Community institutions
or Member States ‘which are incompatible with observance of the human
48 On the principles of the supremacy, of the direct efficacy and of the interpretations
conforming to EU law, cf. G. BRONZINI-V. PICCONE, La Corte del Lussemburgo «scopre» la
Carta di Nizza: verso una nuova stagione nella tutela «multilevel» dei diritti fondamentali?,
DL, 2006, 4, 979 ss.; ID., La giurisprudenza europea «in movimento»: luci e ombre nel
processo di costruzione di un Ius comune, in G. BRONZINI-V. PICCONE (edited by), La
Carta e le Corti, Chimienti, 2007, p 281ss.; Id., La Carta di Nizza nella giurisprudenza delle
Corti europee, I diritti dell’uomo, 2006, 2, 5 ss.; Id., L’efficacia «anticipata» della Carta di
Nizza: ius receptum?, I diritti dell’uomo, 2007 2, 12ss.; Also M. CARTABIA, L’ora dei diritti
fondamentali, in ID. (edited by), I diritti in azione. Universalità e pluralismo dei diritti
fondamentali nelle Corti europee, Il Mulino, 2007, 30. See also R. CALVANO, Verso un
sistema di garanzie costituzionali dell’UE? La giustizia costituzionale comunitaria dopo il
Trattato di Nizza, GCost., 2001, 1, 209 ss. and the recognition of A. CELOTTO, Giudici
nazionali e Carta di Nizza: Disapplicazione o interpretazione conforme?, in G. BRONZINI-V.
PICCONE (edited by), La Carta e le Corti, op. cit., 29 ss.; A. VON BOGDANDY, I principi
costituzionali dell’Unione europea, Dir. Pub. Comp. Eur., 2005, 2, 581. On the general
principles, cf. E:W: BOCKENFORDE, Diritti fondamentali come norme di principio, in ID.,
Stato, Costituzione, Democrazia, Giuffrè, 2006, 225.
49 “Third, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is included in
Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 1950 and is specifically laid down in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union. The fact that it is fundamental in nature means that respect
for the right is guaranteed in the European Union, pursuant to Article 6 EU” (point 78).
50 Conclusions of Stix-Hackl, 18th March 2004, C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen – und
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rights thus recognised’. Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union reflects that observation” (point 55).
“The Court of Justice therefore appears to base the concept of
human dignity on a comparatively wide understanding, (65) as expressed
in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(66) This article reads as follows: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected” (point 91).
The same broad recognition is given to the right to freedom of
assembly and association in the Conclusions of Advocate General
Jacobs
51. Again using the Charter to support his reasoning, the Advocate
General identifies the sources – among which the Charter of Nice – in
which the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and assembly are
recognised within the supranational legal order
52.
The act of balancing carried out by the Advocates General with
reference to traditional civil rights such as freedom of assembly and to
fundamental principles such as human dignity can, with due respect, be
compared to that found in the Conclusions of the cases Laval and Viking
respectively by Advocate Mengozzi
53 and Poiares Maduro
54 in relation to
art. 28 of the Charter of Nice.
On Laval, Mengozzi reasons like this:
“[…] Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that
‘workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the
right … in cases of conflict of interest, to take collective action to defend
their interests, including strike action’. Article 52(1) of that charter states
that ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised
by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of
those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality,
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet
51 Conclusions of Jacobs, 11th July, 2002, C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale
Transporte und Plazuge v. Republik Osterreich.
52 “[…] Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees freedom of
expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Article 11 of the
Convention similarly guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly and association. More
recently, the rights of freedom of expression and assembly have been reaffirmed in Articles
11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” (point 101)
53 Conclusions of Mengozzi 23rd May 2007, C-341/05, Laval un Partneri LtD v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan
e Svenska Elektrikerforbundet.
54 Conclusions of Poiares Maduro, 23rd May 2007, C-438/05, International Transport
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OU Viking Line
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objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to
protect the rights and freedoms of others’” (point 76).
Again, regarding the Viking case, Poiares Maduro sustains:
“The right to associate and the right to collective action are
essential instruments for workers to express their voice and to make
governments and employers live up to their part of the social contract.
[…]. Accordingly, the rights to associate and to collective action are of a
fundamental character within the Community legal order, as the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reaffirms. The key
question, however, that lies behind the present case, is to what ends
collective action may be used and how far it may go. This touches upon a
major challenge for the Community and its Member States: to look after
those workers who are harmed as a consequence of the operation of the
common market, while at the same time securing the overall benefits
from intra-Community trade” (point 60).
As already mentioned, the indirect application for which the
Charter of Nice is used as semi hard law, represents the most common
form of reference. From the Conclusions considered – among the
numerous examples in the category of indirect application
55, it is clear
the way in which the Charter, although not the source of the decisions, is
a fundamental element in the reasoning process of the Advocates
General. In some significant cases – Omega, Schmidberger, Laval and
Viking – it performs an important function of balancing between the
specific right under consideration and the freedom with which it enters
into conflict/contact in the case in point.
The cases of Omega and Schmidberger, furthermore, are
particularly paradigmatic for at least two reasons. The first is that they
represent a striking case of dyscrasia between the positions of the
Advocate General and that of the Court. Although the Court performs the
function of balancing between fundamental rights and freedom
sanctioned by the Treaty as suggested by the Advocate General, it makes
no reference to the Charter of Nice as the source of cognition and
declaration and/or affirmation of fundamental rights recognised by the
supranational order to sustain the decisions made
56.
55 For a complete view of the 41 Conclusions in which the Advocates General have used the
indirect application technique, cf. the dossier, cit.
56 In the sentence Omega (Court of Justice, 14th October 2004, C-36/02, Omega
Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberburgermeisterin der Bundessadt
Bonn), the Court takes up the discourse on fundamental rights making ample reference to
the previous judgements but never to the Charter of Nice. “It should be recalled in that
context that, according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the
general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures, and that, for that
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The second is that the Conclusions of the Advocate General on the
cases Omega and Schmidberger contain in nuce the line of reasoning
proposed again in the Conclusions and then in the judgments of the Court
on the cases Laval and Viking, with a macroscopic difference. While in
the latter two the Court recognises the right to strike and the freedom of
collective action contained in the Charter of Nice (art. 28) without,
however, taking it seriously enough
57, in the judgments Omega and
Schmidberger although the judges do not use the Charter of Nice, they
do call in to play the fundamental rights of protection of human dignity
and the freedom of assembly, making them prevail over the freedoms
sanctioned in the Treaty in the balancing process
58.
However, it is necessary to note that also in the motivations of
Mengozzi and Poiares Maduro, in the cited cases, the reference to
traditional social rights contained in the Charter is limited and reserved,
and preludes – and in some ways contributes – to a mere recognition, but
not to an affirmation of these rights on the part of the Court, the outcome
being a balancing effect which “makes a loss”.
The reference to the principle of proportionality and its
reconstruction of those rights which are half-way between theory of
external limits (they find limitation in the corresponding exercise of
economic freedom) or, even more significantly, of internal limits (the aim
itself of the union action is not free but “conditioned” by exercising
economic freedom) indicates a different cultural metabolising not only by
the judges, but also of the Advocates General, of these rights compared
to the same civil and political rights in the supranational order and
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection
of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are
signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has
special significance in that respect (see, inter alia, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925,
paragraph 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37;
Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; Case C-112/00
Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 71)”(point 33). And also “As the Advocate
General argues in paragraphs 82 to 91 of her Opinion, the Community legal order
undeniably strives to ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law. There
can therefore be no doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity is compatible with
Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, the principle of
respect for human dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental right”
(point 34).
Similar considerations are found in the Schmidberger sentence (Court of Justice, 12
th June
2003, C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v. Republik
Osterreich).
57 Cf. B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali, cit. text and notes 130.
58 J. MORIJN, Balancing Fundamental rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law:
Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution, Eur. Law Journ., 2006,
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compared to the way in which the right to strike and collective bargaining
are collocated (in terms of absoluteness and primacy) in the “juridical
imagination” of national judges, as happens, for example in the Italian
legal system.
From this point of view, both the conclusions and the judgments
on the cases Laval and Viking are probably destined to open, rather than
close, a season of fruitful dialogue between national and European judges
on the subject of social rights
59.
4.3. Use of the Charter as hard law, that is, as normative
foundation of rights, with binding effectiveness. The case of direct
application.
4.3.1 The position of the Advocates General
Pioneering positions which could be considered predictive of the
future role of the Charter of Nice once the Treaty of reform has been
ratified by the institutive treaties, have been taken by some Advocates
General. Particularly sensitive to the idea of considering the Charter of
Nice as an innovation in Union law, they tend towards a direct
application of fundamental rights, therein sanctioned, as if already legally
binding. There is no lack of recent examples, even in judgments of the
Court of Justice, although less numerous.
The Conclusions of Advocate General Tizzano are particularly
pertinent, for both the times and the ways, in the sentence BECTU of
February 2001. In them reference is made to art. 31 to sustain clearly
and explicitly, the nature of the fundamental right to holidays. In this
case, there is an illustrious and visionary use with a direct efficacy.
The Advocate General states, in fact: “I think therefore that, in
proceedings concerned with the nature and scope of a fundamental right,
the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be ignored; in particular,
we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, where its provisions so
allow, as a substantive point of reference for all those involved - Member
States, institutions, natural and legal persons - in the Community
context. Accordingly, I consider that the Charter provides us with the
most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid
annual leave constitutes a fundamental right” (point 28).
It is the Charter in itself which attributes the value of fundamental
social right to holidays, and not through the support of the traditional
constitutions of the Member States.
59 B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali nello spazio sociale sovranazionale e nazionale: indifferenza,
conflitto o integrazione? (prime riflessioni a ridosso dei casi Laval e Viking), in WP C.S.D.L.E.
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The position of Tizzano is to be considered not only for its content,
but also because it came into play ahead of its time, compared to the
normal period necessary for metabolising and elaborating the question of
the Charter’s juridical efficacy, by legal scholars
60. It is as if the Advocate
General played ahead of the game, not regarding simply the nonetheless
important question of the specific right to holidays, but the question –
which transcends the specific right – of the general juridical significance
of the Charter, only recently proclaimed at Nice, and even more, of the
constitutional base of the European order.
Another example of a paradigmatic approach are the recent
Conclusions of Verica Trstenjak in the Schultz-Hoff
61 and Stringer e a.
62
cases regarding right to holidays, which follow on from the opinion of
Advocate General Tizzano. The line of reasoning in both cases is highly
significant and it is not by chance that the position taken by the Advocate
General regards a right, that of holidays, which is the protagonist of the
celebrated sentence given immediately following the approbation of the
Charter of Nice by the Court of Justice in the BECTU case; in this
sentence the EU judges, on the suggestion of Advocate General Tizzano,
recognised the right to holidays as a fundamental social right, but
contrary to the clear suggestion formulated in the Conclusions, they did
not intend to place the right to holidays on the same legal platform of
fundamental rights, – at that time only just established – but rather on
their own “creative” judge made law
63.
Advocate General Trstenjak, repeating the position already
expressed by Tizzano – which with hindsight we could define as
pioneering – , without a doubt considers the right to holidays as a
fundamental social right.
60 Advocate Gen. Tizzano elaborated his Conclusions just two months after the adhesion and
proclamation of the Charter on the 7
th December 2000.
61 Conclusions of Trstenjak, 24th January 2008, C-350/06 Schultz-Hoff.
62 Conclusions of Trstenjak, 24th January 2008, C-520/06 Stringer e. a
63 To point 39 of the sentence of 26th June 2001, C-173/99, The Queen v. Secretary for
Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre
Union (BECTU) the Court affirms that “In that context, the fourth recital in the preamble to
the directive refers to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
adopted at the meeting of the European Council held at Strasbourg on 9 December 1989
which declared, in point 8 and the first subparagraph of point 19, that every worker in the
European Community must enjoy satisfactory health and safety conditions in his working
environment and that he is entitled, in particular, to paid annual leave, the duration of
which must be progressively harmonised in accordance with national practices”.
Consequently “[…] the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded
as a particularly important principle of Community social law from which there can be no
derogations and whose implementation by the competent national authorities must be
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He goes back in time, listing the international origins of the right
to holidays
64 and recalling how its codification in art. 7 of the directive no.
2003/88 CE – object of the request for interpretation contained in the
preliminary reference procedure – ends by creating a sort of cross
fertilisation.
As the Advocate General writes, the right to holidays is “[…] is
unequivocally included among workers’ fundamental rights”.
But adds – in complete agreement with Tizzano’s position – an
element of great appreciation for the Charter of Nice as a of a system
sources; he declares, in fact, its supremacy over other European
Charters.
He express his ideas thus:
“Even more significant, in my view, is the fact that the inclusion of
this right in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union appears to provide the most reliable and definitive confirmation
that it constitutes a fundamental right […]” (point 51).
His considerations on the juridical nature of the Charter are also
interesting.
He affirms that, in spite of the fact it has not been attributed with
an “far-reaching normative powers, nonetheless, “[…] it would be wrong
to deny the Charter any relevance in interpreting Community
law. Irrespective of the question of the definitive legal status of the
Charter within the legal system of the European Union, which will have to
be clarified in future, it already constitutes a concrete expression of
shared fundamental European values” (point 52).
In support of this interpretation he brings forward an argument of
cross fertilisation. It recalls, in fact, the position of those who affirm that
the right to paid annual holidays, as sactioned by art. 40, no. 2 of the
Spanish Constitution, is the result of a combination of international
instruments aimed at protecting fundamental rights
65.
64 As clarified by the Att. Gen. in fact on an international level this fundamental right is
mentioned in art. 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted on 10
th
December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which confers to everyone
“the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay” It is also recognised by art.2. n. 3. of the Social Charter of the Council of
Europe adopted by the Member States of the Council of Europe on the 18
th October 1961 in
Turin and became effective on the 26
th February 1965, and also art.7, lett. d) of the
International Pact regarding economic, social and cultural rights unanimously adopted on
the 19
th December 1966 by the General Assembly of the United Nations as an expression of
the rights of everyone to fair and favourable working conditions.
65 I. GARCIA PERROTE ESCARTIN, I., Sobre el derecho de vacaciones in AA. VV., Scritti in
memoria di Massimo D’Antona, Giuffré, Milano, 2004, vol. IV, p. 3586, who retains that
such instruments have contributed generally to the development of a universal con science
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In the same can be said of the Conclusions rendered on 13
th
December 2007, the Advocate General Kokott
66. This case did not deal
with a typical social right such as the right to holidays, but of a right of
the new generation: the right to “good administration”, a principle which
has some similarities to the principle of good performance in the Italian
constitution, art. 97.
As is known, in the internal debate in legal-administrative
67 and
labour law
68 doctrine, the principle of good performance breaks away
from an abstract and ontological vision of public interest, and from a
coldly efficient concept of achieving ends.
The regulations of the Charter of Nice on the right to good
administration (art. 41) – immediately considered mandatory in the
Advocates General’s interpretation – legitimises the reinterpretation of
some of the principles of the internal Constitution, according to the
proposal formulated elsewhere
69.
On a systematic level of sources, Advocate General Kokott
considers, in fact, the obligation of communication, and therefore, the
principle of transparency of public administration of which to art. 41 of
the Charter of Nice co. 2, third hyphen refers, on the same level as that
established by article 253 of the Treaty.
In fact it seems clear from the reasoning of the Advocate General
that the regulation regarding primary rights of the Union presents itself
as a specification of a rule of principle (art. 41 of the Charter), which is
the basis of a fundamental right (a “principle of state of rights”)
70.
66 Conclusions of Kokott, 13th December 2007, C-413/06P, Bertelsmann AG and Sony
Corporation of America v. Independent Music Publishers and Labels association (Impala)
67 G. ARENA, Cittadini attivi, Editori Laterza, 2006; B. G. MATTARELLA, Il diritto dell’onestà,
etica pubblica e pubblici funzionari, Il Mulino, 2007, 35 ss.; B. G. MATTARELLA, Le regole
dell’onestà, Il Mulino, 2007; B. CARUSO, La flessibilità (ma non solo) del lavoro pubblico
nella l. 133/08 (quando le oscillazioni del pendolo si fanno frenetiche), LPA, 2008, 3-4, 465
ss.
68 G. NICOSIA, Il polimorfismo delle dirigenze pubbliche e la "buona amministrazione", WP
C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” IT – 81/2008
69 Cf. A. ALAIMO, Il diritto al lavoro fra Costituzione nazionale e Carte europee dei diritti: un
diritto “aperto” e “multilivello”, WP C.S.D.L.E “Massimo D’Antona”. INT – 60/2008; B.
CARUSO, Occupabilità, formazione e “capability” nei modelli giuridici di regolazione dei
mercati del lavoro, DLRI, 2007, 1 ss.
70 The Advocate General affirms, “Article 253 EC provides that decisions by the Commission
shall state the reasons on which they are based. This duty to state reasons is a
consequence of the rule of law and, in conjunction with the right to proper administration,
finds expression also in Article 41 (2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European
Union. It is intended not only to enable acts of the institutions to be subject to independent
review by the Community Courts, but also to encourage the institutions to exercise self-
control and to guard against ill-considered or ill-thought through measures. The statement
of reasons for decisions also contributes to ensuring transparency of administrative action”30 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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Regarding another aspect of the case, although in the form of an
obiter dictum the Advocate General did not hesitate to use the Charter of
Nice again, in particular articles 16 (freedom to conduct a business) and
17 (right to property) in an anti monopolistic function and as a direct and
only source of the rights evoked
71.
The inclination manifested by the Advocates General to constantly
refer to and apply the Charter of Nice is fully documented and justified by
the observations made on its nature and significance, not only political
but also juridical.
It is not formally collocated next to positive primary law: no-one
could go so far as to affirm this considering the fact it has not been
ratified. However, the principles and rights of the Charter of Nice have
been considered for some time as immanent to provisions of primary law,
conditioning and limiting its interpretation.
Kokott expresses this in the following Conclusions:
“Admittedly, the Charter of fundamental rights does not yet as
such have binding legal effect comparable to that of primary law, but as a
source of recognition of law it does shed light on the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Community law […]” (note 59)
72.
Following this reasoning, the ratification of the Charter would be
nothing other than the undoubtedly useful formalisation on a systematic
(point 97) and adds: “The obligation to state reasons is by no means restricted to decisions
which negatively affect their addressees. The principles of the rule of law and of proper
administration instead require reasons to be given also for decisions which benefit their
addressees. This applies a fortiori where such decisions may negatively affect the rights and
interests of third parties, not least in the field of competition law. Accordingly, neither
Article 253 EC nor the third indent of Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights
distinguishes between decisions which benefit their respective addressees and those which
are disadvantageous for them […]” (point 98). And also “[…] Neither Article 253 EC nor the
third indent of Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights distinguishes between
decisions which benefit their respective addressees and those which are disadvantageous
for them as regards the requirement to state reasons” (point 134). “The rights of the
defence include in particular the principle of the right to a hearing, which is a fundamental
principle of Community law and which is now also recognised in Article 41(2) of the Charter
of fundamental rights […]” (point 151).
71 “[…] Thus, while the commercial freedom of the participating undertakings and the
property rights of their shareholders (Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of fundamental
rights) undoubtedly include the right to realise concentrations of undertakings, this applies
only in so far as certain conditions or obligations on, or even the prohibition of, the
concentration in question are not necessary for protecting competition from distortion”
(point 214).
72 Regarding this point, the same Advocate General cites some examples of the use of the
Charter of Nice: the sentence of 27th June 2006, C-540/03, Parliament v. Council , “family
reunited”, and paragraph 108 of the Conclusions of the same presented the 8
th September
2005, C-540/03, in the same case, as well as the sentence of 13
th March 2007, C-432/05,
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level, but not necessary on a substantial level (regarding a particular
decision) for operations of affirmation of rights, which are already,
possible in the current state, in hybrid form: its preceptive efficacy could
be facilitated, the Advocate General seems to be saying, by the
interpretations of the judges, given that the business of approbation has
not yet been concluded.
A similar affirmation is contained also in the Conclusions European
Parliament v. Council of the European Union of the 8
th September 2005
73,
paragraph 108:
“[…] While the Charter still does not produce binding legal effects
comparable to primary law, it does, as a material legal source, shed light
on the fundamental rights which are protected by the Community legal
order. For the present Directive there is a further relevant consideration:
according to the second recital, the Directive is intended to be compatible
with the fundamental rights recognised inter alia in the Charter […]”
The Conclusions of Advocate General Léger on the Hautala case
of the 10
th July 2001
74 are even clearer and more significant regarding
the nature of the Charter; its efficacy is facilitated, perhaps with an
argument which technically is debatable, via its own moral strength, its
very being indicating an expression of values, even before principles, of
juridical civility shared by the Member States; it is an expression of meta
principles of such importance as to be collocated above the positive
juridical order.
The citation, a sort of vademecum of the juridical efficacy of the
Charter, is self-explanatory:
“Naturally, the clearly-expressed wish of the authors of the
Charter not to endow it with binding legal force should not be overlooked.
However, aside from any consideration regarding its legislative scope, the
nature of the rights set down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights
precludes it from being regarded as a mere list of purely moral principles
without any consequences. It should be noted that those values have in
common the fact of being unanimously shared by the Member States,
which have chosen to make them more visible by placing them in a
charter in order to increase their protection. The Charter has undeniably
placed the rights which form its subject-matter at the highest level of
values common to the Member States (point 80).
73 Kolkott’s Conclusions, 8th September 2005, C-540/03 European Parliament v. Council of
the European Union.
74 Léger’s Conclusions 10th July 2001, C-353/99 P, Council of the European Union v. Heidi
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It is known that the political and moral values of a society are not
all to be found in positive law. However, where rights, freedoms and
principles are described, as in the Charter, as needing to occupy the
highest level of reference values within all the Member States, it would be
inexplicable not to take from it the elements which make it possible to
distinguish fundamental rights from other rights (point 81).
The sources of those rights, listed in the preamble to the Charter,
are for the most part endowed with binding force within the Member
States and the European Union. It is natural for the rules of positive
Community law to benefit, for the purposes of their interpretation, from
the position of the values with which they correspond in the hierarchy of
common values (point 82).
As the solemnity of its form and the procedure which led to its
adoption would give one to assume, the Charter was intended to
constitute a privileged instrument for identifying fundamental rights. It is
a source of guidance as to the true nature of the Community rules of
positive law” (point 83).
Such a statement does not seem casual, but its reiteration tells us
of an orientation, if not agreed upon, certainly concurred with by the
general advocatory of the Court. In fact we can compare
75 the practically
identical statements of Advocate General Mischo for the case Booker
Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood of the 20
th September 2001
76 of
Advocate General Poiares Maduro for the case Nardone of the 29
th June
2004
77 and of the same Kokott of the 14
th October 2004
78, 27
th January
75 On the subject see the dossier, cit.
76 Mischo’s Conclusions, 20th September 2001, joint cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker
Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood. “I know that the Charter is not legally binding, but it is
worthwhile referring to it given that it constitutes the expression, at the highest level, of a
democratically established political consensus on what must today be considered as the
catalogue of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order […]” (point 126).
77 Maduro’s Conclusions, 29th June 2004, C-181/03 P. Nardone: “First, the situation of
those officials relates to a fundamental right of access to social security benefits providing
protection in cases such as illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the
case of loss of employment. That right is entailed by Article 12 of the 1961 European Social
Charter and point 10 of the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, Article 136 EC expressly referring to both charters. That right is currently laid
down in Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although it
does not as yet have binding legal effects, the abovementioned charter none the less serves
as a guide to and point of reference for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal
order. The specific purpose of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations is to provide such
protection in the European public service” (point 51).
78 Kokott’s Conclusions, 14th October 2004, C-387/02, C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02,
Penal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi (C-387/02), Sergio Adelchi (C-391/02) and
Marcello Dell’Uri e a. (C-403/02) “Although this Charter does not yet have binding legalTHE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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2005
79 and 4
th September 2008
80 respectively for the Berlusconi et al.
case and also Housieaux and UTECA.
Justified by the considerations on the juridical nature of the
Charter – which although not legally binding, constitutes a criteria of
recognition or cognition of the rights guaranteed by the EU legal order
81,
(it should not be used, but it must) – the Advocates General have always
called upon it directly or indirectly in varying degrees, determining to a
greater or lesser degree the resolution of the concrete question to be
interpreted ever since the Charter’s inception.
Over the years more decisive affirmations have been made; to
Tizzano’s Conclusions on the BECTU regarding right to holidays already
mentioned, followed by Trstenjak in Schultz-Hoff and Stringer e a. –
equally significant examples have been added; on the right to human
dignity the case The Netherlands against European Parliament and
Council of European Union of the 14
th June 2001
82; regarding respect for
effect comparable to that of primary law, it does at least, as a legal reference, provide
information on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order […]” (note
83).
79 Kokott’s Conclusions, 27th January 2005, C-186/04 Pierre Housieaux in which the Att.
Gen. refers to the conclusions on the Berlusconi case, on which see previous note.
80 Kokott’s Conclusions, 4th September 2008, C-222/07, UTECA “[…] Admittedly, it still does
not produce binding legal effects comparable to primary law but it does, as a material legal
reference, shed light on the fundamental rights which are protected by the Community legal
order […]” (note 72).
81 In this sense, it is clear that the part of the doctrine which retains that the Charter is an “
atypical source” to be put in context among the normative sources «similarly to other EU
primary sources, among which “common traditions”, “the general structural principles of
treaties”, common law, and therefore, as such, “destined to represent the source of
cognition of the rights expressed by these traditions”». In this sense, A. BARBARA, La Carta
europea dei diritti: una fonte di ri-cognizione!, in Dir. Un. eur., 2001, 241 ss. Taken up by
E. PAGANO, Il valore giuridico della Carta dei diritti fondamentali e le competenze
dell'Unione, in DPCE, 2003, p. 1723 ss.
82 Jacob’s Conclusions, 14th June 2001, C-377/98, The Netherlands v. European Parliament
and The Council of Euopean Union. “There can be no doubt in my view that the rights
invoked by the Netherlands are indeed fundamental rights, respect for which must be
ensured in the Community legal order. The right to human dignity is perhaps the most
fundamental right of all, and is now expressed in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, which states that human dignity is inviolable and must be
respected and protected. The right to free and informed consent both of donors of elements
of the human body and of recipients of medical treatment can also properly be regarded as
fundamental; it is also now reflected in Article 3(2) of the EU Charter which requires in the
fields of medicine and biology respect for the free and informed consent of the person
concerned, according to procedures laid down by law. It must be accepted that any
Community instrument infringing those rights would be unlawful” (point 197). “It is of
course clearly desirable that no element of human origin should be taken from a person
without their consent. That principle is expressed at the forefront of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights; it is also enshrined in Chapter II of the Council of Europe Convention34 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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the environment in the case The Commision of the European Community
versus The Italian Republic of the 8
th January 2004
83; on the principle of
respect for linguistic diversity in the case Kingdom of Spain versus
Eurojust of the 16
th December 2004
84 and UTECA of 4
th September
2008
85; on respect for private and family life in the case European
Parliament versus Council of European Union of the 8
th September
2005
86; on the right to effective jurisdictional protection in the case
Sfakianaki AEVA versus Elliniko Dimosio of the 20
th October 2005
87 SECAP
on human rights and biomedicine, which provides that an intervention in the health field
may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to
it” (point 210).
83 Colomer’s Conclusions, 8th January 2004, C-87/02, Commission of the European
Community v. The Italian Republic in which at point 36 it is said “Community citizens are
entitled to demand fulfilment of that responsibility under Article 37 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees a high level of environmental
protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment”.
84 Poiares Maduro’s Conclusions, 16th December 2004, C-160/03, Kingdom of Spain v.
Eurojust. “In a Union intended to be an area of freedom, security and justice, in which it is
sought to establish a society characterised by pluralism, respect for linguistic diversity is of
fundamental importance. That is an aspect of the respect which the Union owes, in the
terms of Article 6(3) EU, to the national identities of the Member States. The principle of
respect for linguistic diversity has also been expressly upheld by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe. That principle is a specific expression of the plurality inherent in the European
Union” (point 35). “It is noteworthy in that connection that the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union upholds, in Article 21, the role of non-discrimination as a
fundamental right enforceable against the institutions of the Union” (note 41).
85 Kokott’s Conclusions, 4th September 2008, C-222/07, UTECA “Respect for and promotion
of diversity in the cultural sector is also important to the European Union because it is this
very diversity that is so characteristic of Europe and European culture. The idea of ‘unity in
diversity’ therefore forms one of the cornerstones of the European Union, whilst Article 22
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that the Union shall
respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (point 94).
86 Kokott’s Conclusions, 8th September 2005, C-540/03, European Parliament v .Council of
European Union. “In that regard it is appropriate to recall Article 7 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (Article II-67 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe) which
provides that everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home
and communications” (point 7). “By these words, the Community legislature evokes the
specific prohibitions of discrimination set out in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights (Article II-81 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe)” (point 9). “In so
far as it is relevant here, Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, cited in the second recital in the preamble to the Directive, is identical to Article 8 of
the ECHR. Moreover, the first sentence of Article 52(3) of the Charter (Article II-112 of the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe) provides that its meaning and scope are to be
the same” (point 60).
87 Léger’s Conclusions Sfakianaki AEVA versus Elliniko Dimosio of the 20
th October 2005,
Joined cases C-23/04 to 25/04 “It is settled case-law that the right to an effective remedy
before a court or a tribunal constitutes a general principle of Community law which underlies
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SpA (C-147/06) and Santorso Soc. Coop. arl (C-148/06) v. Town Council
of Turin of 27
th November 2007
88 and Varec SA against State of Belgium
of 25
th October 2006
89.
Among these, the Conclusions of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer of the 11
th January 2007 are particularly noteworthy. The case in
point deals with the social right par excellence, the right to health
contained in art. 35 of the Charter. The Conclusions are also worth
highlighting for the reference made to the right to health care as explicit
limit to the fundamental economic freedom sanctioned by the Treaty, in
this case with a more decisive position compared to that assumed by
Advocates General Poiares and Mengozzi on the Viking and Laval cases
regarding the right to strike and collective bargaining (supra).
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer says: “[…] although the
case-law takes as the main point of reference the fundamental freedoms
established in the Treaty, there is another aspect which is becoming more
and more important in the Community sphere, namely the right of
citizens to health care, proclaimed in Article 35 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since, ‘being a fundamental
asset, health cannot be considered solely in terms of social expenditure
and latent economic difficulties’. This right is perceived as a personal
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is based on Articles 6
and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It
is the duty of the Court to ensure observance of fundamental rights in the field of
Community law […]” (point 50).
88 Colomer’s Conclusions, 27th November 2007, C-147/06 and 148/06 SECAP SpA (C-
147/06) and Santorso Soc. Coop. arl (C-148/06) v. Town Council of Turin“The right not to
be deprived of the opportunity to be heard is expressly provided for in the legal systems of
all the Member States and forms part of the right to good administration enshrined in Article
41, under Chapter V on citizens’ rights, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. Article 41(2) recognises the right of every person to be heard before any
individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken” (point 50). “The
Charter, whose importance the Court has recently made clear, in particular in the
judgments in Parliament v Council and Advocaten voor de Wereld, requires that, before a
tenderer is excluded, he must have the opportunity to state his views in order to persuade
the contracting authority that his bid is genuine” (point 51).
89 Sharpston’s Conclusions, 25th October 2006, C-450/06, Varec SA v. State of Belgium
“Under the European Convention on Human Rights and under the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the right to a fair hearing is an unqualified right. However, it does not follow that the
entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is likewise an absolute right. […]” (point 39).
“Under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the right to good administration
includes ‘the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy’. A general
obligation to respect business secrecy is imposed on the Community institutions by Article
287 EC, and confirmed in a number of legislative provisions, particularly in the field of
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entitlement, unconnected to a person’s relationship with social security,
and the Court of Justice cannot overlook that aspect” (point 40)
90.
4.3.2. The position of the Court of Justice.
Regarding the Court of Justice, as has already been clarified, the
approach to the Charter of Nice is certainly more cautious than that of
the Advocates General’s. This is demonstrated by the fact that compared
to the remarkable number of Conclusions in which there is a direct
application of the fundamental rights sanctioned by the Charter, there are
no actual judgments that go so far.
However, in a recent ruling it would appear that a tentative move
was made towards direct application of the Charter although the move
opted for a non-compromising reference: the articles called on, in fact,
enter in the judgment indirectly, that is through the reference to the
identified fundamental rights using the Charter of Nice as parameter.
The reference regards the sentence of 29
th January 2008, C-
275/06, Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefònica de
Espana SAU in which the Court used the fundamental rights contained in
the Charter of Nice as parameter of legitimacy for the correct
interpretation and application of EU law.
The Court expressed itself thus:
“The national court refers in its order for reference to Articles 17
and 47 of the Charter, the first of which concerns the protection of the
right to property, including intellectual property, and the second of which
concerns the right to an effective remedy. By so doing, that court must
be regarded as seeking to know whether an interpretation of those
directives to the effect that the Member States are not obliged to lay
down, in order to ensure the effective protection of copyright, an
obligation to communicate personal data in the context of civil
proceedings leads to an infringement of the fundamental right to property
and the fundamental right to effective judicial protection”(point 61).
And adds:
“However, the situation in respect of which the national court puts
that question involves, in addition to those two rights, a further
fundamental right, namely the right that guarantees protection of
personal data and hence of private life” (point 63).
90 Conclusions of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 11th January 2007 C-444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki
v. NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE). The citation taken from
point 40 by the Att. Gen. is contained in Opinions of the European Economic and Social
Committee on the theme “Health care” approved by Plenum on the 16
th and 17
th of July
2003 (GU C 234, pag. 36).THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
STATEMENT OF REASONS (2000-2008)
37
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 74/2009
And furthermore:
“According to recital 2 in the preamble to Directive 2002/58, the
directive seeks to respect the fundamental rights and observes the
principles recognised in particular by the Charter. In particular, the
directive seeks to ensure full respect for the rights set out in Articles 7
and 8 of that Charter. Article 7 substantially reproduces Article 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, which
guarantees the right to respect for private life, and Article 8 of the
Charter expressly proclaims the right to protection of personal data”
(point 64).
And concludes
“The present reference for a preliminary ruling thus raises the
question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of
different fundamental rights, namely the right to respect for private life
on the one hand and the rights to protection of property and to an
effective remedy on the other” (point 65).
In a more recent sentence, the Court of Justice seems to have
taken a step forward compared to its position previously described, even
though it is true to say that an isolated pronouncement cannot claim to
be representative of a trend. The sentence in question is of the 16
th
December 2008, C-47/2007 P., Masdar (UK) Ltd v. The Commission of
the European Community on the subject of the right to an effective
remedy.
The Court affirms:
“Actions for unjust enrichment do not fall under the rules
governing non-contractual liability in the strict sense, which, to be
invoked, require a number of conditions to be satisfied, relating to the
unlawfulness of the conduct imputed to the Community, the fact of the
damage alleged and the existence of a causal link between that conduct
and the damage complained of […]. They differ from actions brought
under those rules in that they do not require proof of unlawful conduct –
indeed, of any form of conduct at all – on the part of the defendant, but
merely proof of enrichment on the part of the defendant for which there
is no valid legal basis and of impoverishment on the part of the applicant
which is linked to that enrichment” (point 49).
And concludes, applying the Charter without ifs and buts and
citing its previous uses as a European Bill of rights, in an exceedingly
important passage:
“However, despite those characteristics, the possibility of bringing
an action for unjust enrichment against the Community cannot be denied
to a person solely on the ground that the EC Treaty does not make38 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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express provision for a means of pursuing that type of action. If
Article 235 EC and the second paragraph of Article 288 EC were to be
construed as excluding that possibility, the result would be contrary to
the principle of effective judicial protection, laid down in the case-law of
the Court and confirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights
of the European Union, proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000 […]”
(point 50).
It is evident that among the significant episodes in the history of
the application of the Charter of Nice hereto described a prominent
place is occupied by the previously mentioned judgments Laval and
Viking, the epilogues of which are vastly different to the one just
described by the sentence Promusicae. In the latter case, the Court put
into act an operation of balancing between the two fundamental rights
sanctioned by the Charter, in the end interpreting the directives which
were object of the preliminary question in the light of the rights evoked,
and subordinating the implementation of the measures of transposition
by Member States in respect to a “constitutionally orientated”
interpretation (rectius, guided by fundamental rights).
On the other hand, in Laval and Viking, the Court recognised the
right to collective action, bringing it within the sphere of application of
EU law and thus justifying an operation of balancing. At the end of this
process, the fundamental right under consideration conceded before the
need to protect the fundamental freedoms sanctioned by the Treaty.
5. 2
nd Part. Domestic decisions. Use of the Charter as
interpretive support in relation to soft or semi hard
law. The case of indirect application.
The Charter of Nice is now fully recognised, even in the decision-
making process of Italian judges. There are various examples in which
the Courts – Court of First Instance, Court of Cassation and the
Constitutional Court – have demonstrated their acceptance of the
Charter as a source of law
91.
In the majority of cases the path followed by national and
supranational judges is that of indirect application, in which the Charter
of Nice is referred to as a source of semi hard law by confirming a
decision already made using other normative references.
This is what happened in the sentence of the 16
th October 2007,
in which the Court of Cassation sustained that:
91 For complete and reasoned recognition of all the Italian judiciary in the light of the
classification prospected in this survey, cf. again the dossier cit.THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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“From the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
we deduce how the informed and free consent of the patient to medical
treatment must be considered, not only from the point of view of the
lawfulness of the treatment, but above all as a real fundamental right of
the European citizen, afferent to the more general right to the integrity
of the person”
92.
Another example of a reference to the Charter to “persuasive”
ends can be found in the Constitutional Court 24
th April, 2002, n. 135
93.
Worthy of note and useful to highlight the attitude of National
judges is also the sentence of the 9
th July 2008
94 in which the Court of
Cassation refers to art. 11 of the Charter of Nice as an integral part of the
principles of the Community and of European constitutional traditions.
“In this sense in is useful to consider also article 11 of the Charter
of Nice, recalled in the recent Treaty of Lisbon, as an integral part of EU
principles and of the common constitutional traditions within Europe. The
said article considers the freedom of expression and opinion, even
criticism, beside the freedom of information. The Treaty is in the process
of ratification, but a suplimentary interpretation of Italian constitutional
norms (art. 21 Cost.) must also be guaranteed by Italian National
judges”.
The Constitutional Court also ruled on the right to access all
information regarding medical treatment in a recent sentence of the 23
rd
of December 2008
95, enumerating the Charter of Nice and the right
sanctioned in it among the domestic and European constitutional
sources
96.
92 Cass. 16th October 2007 n. 21748.
93 On the subject of limiting freedom of domicile the Court affirms that a hypothetical
restriction of the limitative measures of the freedom of domicile to those expressly typified
as well as not having a basis in art. 14 of the Charter «Would not find nothing comparable
in the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, nor in the
International pact on civil rights, nor, finally, in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the
European Union, proclaimed in Nice in December 2000, hereby recalled - even though it
lacks juridical efficacy – for its expression of principles common to all European legal
orders».
94 Cass., section III, 9th July 2008, n. 18849.
95 Constitutional Court, 23 december 2008, n. 438.
96 “It is necessary to underline that informed consent, intended as an expression of the
conscious adhesion to the health treatment proposed by the doctor, amounts to a real and
concrete right of the person and finds basis in the principles expressed in art. 2 of the
Constitution, which protects and promotes the fundamental rights and in art. 13 and 32 of
the Constitution which establish, respectively, that “ personal freedom is unassailable” and
that “no-one can be obliged to a certain healthcare if not by disposition of the law.”
“Numerous international laws provide for the necessity of informed consent of the patient
regarding medical treatment. In particular, art. 24 of the Convention on rights of the child,40 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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Recently, in a sentence of the 3
rd of July 2008, the Court of
Cassation used the Charter of Nice in a more compounded discourse in
which the need for an interpretation of individual rights in the light of
international sources was highlighted.
In this, the Court of Cassation goes beyond mere reference to the
specific right contained in the Charter and so it assumes a far more
general and significant task: the reference to the Charter becomes an
opportunity for an unequivocal discussion on the sources of the European
juridical order. The passage regarding the theory of a unitary legal order
seems more than a simple “assist” to the Constitutional Court, still
attested, although with some recent signs of yielding on the theory of
separation
97.
References to the Charter are frequent also in the judgments of
the Court of the First Instance, as for example in the ruling of the Court
of Salerno, 21
st April 2008
98.
In the majority of domestic judges’ rulings, as in those of EU
judges, there are significant affirmations on the juridical value of the
signed in New York on the 20
th November 1989 [..]”; art. 3 of Fundamental rights of the EU,
proclaimed at Nice 7
th December 2000 […]”.
97 In fact, the Court sustains “It is quite true that the Constitutional Court with the
judgments 348 and 349 of the 24
th October 2007, anterior to the deliberation of this Court,
but also to the negative ordinance of 2008 currently being examined, considered binding for
this court, have constituted a turning point for opening our constitutional system of justice
towards EU legislation, consenting the Italian Court to instigate a dialogue with the
European Court of Human Rights, as the Traty of Lisbon expects, currently in the process of
ratification ( according to the governative agenda and bill deposited in parliament) with the
reception of the Charter of Nice in the Treaty of the European Union. This turning point,
which once and for all supersedes the limits posed by the Constitutional Court with the
distant ruling of 19
th January 1993 no. 10, requires an improved interpretation of the
system of sources starting from the text of art. 117 Italian Constitution, comma 1, which
requires an additional relationship with European sources on the fundamental rights of the
person. (European Council and Charter of Nice) and a comparison via dialogue with the
rulings of the EU Court of Justice […]” Cf. Cass., section III, 3
rd July 2008, n. 18203. On the
circulation of juridical models of protection through dialogue between the Courts, for all. A.
SPERTI, Dialogue between constitutional courts and resorting to juridical comparison in
experience, Riv. Dir. Cost., 2006, 225 ss.; also D: WILLIAMS, Court and Globalisation in
Indiana Journ. Global Legal Studies, 2004, p. 57; R. MUNCH, Constructing a European
Society by jurisdiction, European Law Journal, 2008, 5, 519.
98 The Judge affirms ”Rather, the competence for the specialized areas should be, since their
institution, extended to the protection of all intellectual property, which, on the basis of the
EC Treaty introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, by additional protocol from 1952
of European convention for the protection of human rights, from the Charter of Nice in
2000, as well as the institutive conventions of the various international organisations having
general competence on the same intellectual property, must have as their object patents for
inventions, models of utility, designs or industrial models, the manufacturing, marketing or
service brands, the trading name and indications of the provenience or denomination of
origin, as well as the repression of unfair competition” ………”THE CHARTER OF NICE IN THE LAW IN ACTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE JUDGES’
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Charter of Nice. For example, on the one hand the Constitutional Court
99
cites art. 49 of the Charter as a rule which functions as “confirmation”,
with reference to the principle of retroactivity of the most favourable
penal law; on the other, it emphasises the Charter’s “expression of
principles common to all European orders”, defining it as “an act which
still lacks juridical value but recognized interpretative importance”
100.
5.1. Use of the Charter as hard law, that is, as normative
foundation of rights. The case of direct application
However, there have been cases where, some domestic judges
have been keen to jump the gun
101, and have gone so far as to sustain
the disapplication of a domestic statutory regulation because it
contrasted with an article from the Charter of Nice.
For example, in a reasoning which was widely criticised by
academic commentators
102, the Court of Appeal of Rome in the ordinance
of the 11
th April 2002 decided to disapply a norm on legal aid contained
in law no. 533/1977 because it was in contrast with article 6 of the
European Convention of Human Rights and with article 47 of the Charter
of Nice
103.
The same approach was taken by The Court of Appeal of Florence,
according to which the principle contained in art. 34.2 of the Charter of
Nice which considers of the social security of non-EU citizens «the
importance of fundamental rights derived from the Courts of The Union
by virtue of the universal nature of the principle of equality», would allow
for the disapplication of national regulations which distinguish who is
eligible to benefit from economic assistance provided by the national
order by the possession of a residence permit, thereby contrasting
radically with the general principle of equality and the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of nationality
104.
Similarly the Court of Ravenna retained it necessary to disapply
the domestic law in order to recognise a disability allowance for a non-
European citizen, although the person in question was not in possession
of a residence permit
105.
99 Const. Court 23
rd November 2006, n. 393.
100 Const. Court. 4th July 2008, n. 251 and Const. Court 24
th October 2007, n. 349. For
further reference cf. the dossier, cit.
101 Cf. B. CARUSO, I diritti sociali fondamentali, op. cit. where there is reference to
“constitutional impatience”.
102 R. CALVANO, La Corte d’appello di Roma applica la Carta dei diritti UE. Diritto pretorio o
Ius comune europeo? in Giur.it., 2002, 12, 2238 ss.
103 Ordinance of the Court of Appeal, Rome, 11th April 2002, Cannella rel.
104 Court of Appeal, Florence, 9th June 2007.
105 Court of Ravenna, 16th January 2008.42 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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On positions partially more cautious – that is which have not
determined the disapplication of domestic laws – The Court of Cassation
has ruled similarly to supranational judges and Advocates General,
whereby the Charter of Nice is used as a source of recognition of
fundamental rights of the European order. For example in the sentence of
11
th November 2002 the Supreme Court sustained, regarding a right
which has no direct corroboration in any of the national Constitutions, the
right to protection against unfair dismissal through compulsory
justification by the employee, which verges on the right to stability of
employment as represented by compulsory re-employment.
“Nor can we neglect, in recognition of the texts which concur in
outlining the features of the International public order, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, whose art. 30 establishes that every
worker has the right to protection against unfair dismissal; without going
into the question here, regarding the juridical efficacy of this text, it is
without doubt the expression of fundamental juridical principles, common
to European orders (in this sense), […]”;
From which the juridical norm
“Given that, through a process of conformation of the order to the
constitutional value of work, we have reached a connotation of the public
order according to which the stability of a position of work constitutes a
principle of the public order and as the stability of the position is
protected by the order via the almost general prohibition of “ad nutum”,
additional parts of the public order are the laws which govern this
protection, in its essential nucleus, expressed by the Charter of
fundamental rights of the Union; if it is true, furthermore, that the real
protection of which reference to art. 18, law 20th May 1970, no. 300
does not qualify as described by the public order, it is also true that this
dimension is part not only of the concrete mechanism through which the
unjustified withdrawal of the employer, but also the principle that the
latter cannot at his will terminate the working relationship. Therefore the
judge, having established that this is the case and having carried out a
study on the compatibility of the foreign law with the public order of the
court, can exclude the application of the former and retain that the law of
the latter is applicable”
106.
Some rulings by the Court of Appeal of Rome are also
representative of a tendency to use the Charter of Nice “as if” it were
legally binding. Although these rulings do not go so far as to disapply
domestic law, they make ample reference to art. 31 on the subject of
rights to equal and fair working conditions for workers, attributing it with
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binding juridical efficacy. The reference is to the judgments of the 4
th
October 2007, 21
st November 2007 and 6
th June 2008 in which the judge
affirms:
“The rights of workers to “equal and fair working conditions”
established by art. 31 of the Charter of Nice with a summarily formula
which wants to cover all those situations of abuse or discrimination not
disciplined by other norms specific to the same European Bill of Rights
[…] lead to an interpretation (having to attribute – in the wake of
jurisprudence of our Constitutional Court – to the Charter of Nice an
“expressive” value of the common constitutional traditions) the EU
discipline and also the national one which has acknowledged the first, in
the sense of requesting the “concrete” specification from the employer
regarding the reason for the dismissal, so as to not compromise the ends
of the agreement framework, of the directive and of the same Italian law,
precedence is given to the legitimate expectations of workers to
“transparency” in referring to “atypical” contractual instruments. In the
sense of art. 51 of the Charter, this applies to EU and national law of
application of the former and the recognition of its acknowledging nature
regarding “common constitutional traditions” implies that – in the senses
of art. 6 TEU – the rights sanctioned by it must be considered general
principles of EU law and as such privileged instrument of interpretation of
supranational and internal legislation which has acknowledges the former
in internal legal order. […] Even the formulas previously mentioned
regarding the Charter of Nice ( including the principle of non
discrimination applied numerous times by the Court of Justice to censure
the irrational discrimination among workers possessing fundamental
rights: for all see the sentence Betcu C – 173/99 of 2001) serve to
achieve this hermeneutic result”.
The affirmations contained in the three rulings considered are
extremely important; not only does the Court apply the Charter of Nice
as if it were already a binding juridical force, but it also clarifies the
reasons for its importance as a European Bill of Rights and source of
“recognition” of the common constitutional traditions which cannot be
ignored in the reconstruction of a normative framework, useful for
resolving a controversy.
6. The Charter of Nice’s steady ascent in juridical
effectiveness in law in action.
The research conducted on law in action constituted by the
decisions of the EU Courts – Court of Justice and Court of First Instance –
and national courts, as well as the Advocates General’s Conclusions,
would indicate a precise trend regarding the use of the Charter of Nice.44 BRUNO CARUSO – MARIAGRAZIA MILITELLO
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As has been already noted, the soft and non-binding character of
the Charter, frequently highlighted by both judges and Advocates
General, has not impeded its being appreciated as a source of recognition
of fundamental rights acknowledged by the supranational order. On the
other hand, however, the lack of binding juridical efficacy has not allowed
it to be used in a way which goes beyond an indirect application, except
in a few cases, courageous as they are unsustainable. This has been the
case when the Conclusions of the Advocate General have been in conflict
with the Court ruling or the widely criticised choice of a few judges to
disapply internal norms.
Instead, in the vast majority of cases, the Charter and the articles
contained therein have played a fundamental part in the path of
reasoning followed by the judges or Advocates General. Rarely used
simply as a “clause of style”, more frequently it has been used as an
essential element to the normative reconstruction useful in the resolution
of specific preliminary questions or of the concrete case in point (in the
case of national judges).
The Charter of Nice is not the first document that contains an
enumeration of fundamental rights; nevertheless, the fact that it has a
position of supremacy over the other European Charters, as well as being
successful with the Advocates General (cf. above, par. 4.3.1) is
demonstrated by the constant use which following its proclamation the
Advocates General have made of it, followed a year or so later by the
Courts.
The proof of the desire to attribute the Charter with an efficacy
which goes beyond its true soft nature was then provided by some italian
judges who had in fact called on it to sustain the disapplication of an
domestic law presumably in contrast with a fundamental right sanctioned
in Nice.
It is certain that the prospect then destroyed, of incorporating the
Bill of Rights contained in the Charter of Nice within a European
Constitution had rekindled dampened hopes regarding a constitutional
recognition of fundamental rights, signalling the start of a flourishing
phase of rulings orientated to the attribution, if not of binding efficacy, at
least of a central importance in the construction of supranational
legislation.
The failure of the project and a moment of despondency have
not, however, changed some of the key elements, which are by now
founded on consolidated territory (as for example on the subject of right
to holiday).
On the other hand, it is equally true that because of the non-
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could have had a different end, if only the Charter had been bestowed
with a binding juridical power. Instead, its persistent soft law nature is
the cause of (even though this does not totally justify) an unequal
balancing to the detriment of classic social rights, which nonetheless are
recognised as fundamental points of reference of the strategy of
European social and political integration and of its constitutional basis.
Furthermore, the judgments on fundamental rights to which we
have referred would seem to trace the first outline of a hierarchy,
however unstable and simplified, between fundamental rights and
principles carried out by the Court of Justice, above all when these rights
are confronted with the economic freedoms, considered by the European
order in the same way as fundamental rights.
The right to healthcare and the right to protection of human
dignity, for example, would seem to have received a higher level of
protection to that reserved for the right to collective self-protection (cf.
the cases Omega, Schmidberger and Aikaterini Stamatelaki).
The dynamic and original nature of the evolution of a European
order, its multi-level and plural structure, create the conditions for the
affirmation of fundamental social rights and balancing operations,
integration and reciprocal osmosis with economic freedoms, performed by
the Courts in reciprocal dialogue. It is this process of forming a real and
unique European law in action which deserves the greatest attention on
the part of the International communities of legal experts.